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Blackstonian Marriage, Gender, and 
Cohabitation 
Naomi Cahn & June Carbone* 
In Blumenthal v. Brewer,1 the Illinois Supreme Court held that it would 
not enforce an alleged agreement between a nonmarital couple that centered 
on their relationship. The National Center for Lesbian Rights argued that the 
court’s holding punished people who entered into a nonmarital relationship.2 
Nancy Polikoff found the opinion “shocking.”3 Albertina Antognini suggests 
that nonmarriage cases refusing to enforce such agreements harm women.4 
These accusations also reflect concern that Blumenthal-type results are 
designed to encourage marriage and penalize others.5 
Our analysis of Blumenthal and the nonmarriage cases starts from a 
different place. We think that the Blumenthal approach may not be entirely 
evil, even though we think Blumenthal itself raises issues about the 
retroactive application of these principles to people who could not marry at 
the time they began their relationship.6 
 
* June Carbone is the Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota 
Law School. Naomi Cahn is the Harold H. Greene Chair, George Washington University Law 
School. We thank Amy Orlov for research assistance, and we are grateful to Albertina Antignoni 
and Kaipo Matsumura for co-organizing the nonmarriage roundtable at which this was first 
presented. 
1. 69 N.E.3d 834, 853 (Ill. 2016). 
2. Defendant-Appellee Eileen M. Brewer’s Petition for Rehearing at 4, Blumenthal v. 
Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834 (Ill. 2016) (No. 10 CH 48730), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/2016.09.07.-Brewer-Pet-for-Rehearing.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SAC-
U357]. 
3. Illinois Supreme Court Deals Major Setback to Unmarried Couples; Its Effect on Gay 
Couples, RAINBOW TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.therainbowtimesmass.com/illinois-
supreme-court-deals-major-setback-to-unmarried-couples/ [https://perma.cc/YBG6-SZ83]. 
4. Professor Antognini notes that a shortcoming in current decisions is that “if a woman 
seeks property in exchange for services, then she should marry.” Albertina Antognini, The Law of 
Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017). 
5. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1207, 1247–48 (2016) (“Blumenthal makes clear Obergefell’s threat to nonmarital 
relationship recognition. First, Obergefell furnishes a constitutional rationale for states to prioritize 
and privilege marriage above nonmarital relationships . . . . [I]f marriage is the most profound and 
meaningful relationship available to adults, the state has a legitimate basis for promoting marriage 
and its many benefits over nonmarital alternatives.”); Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family 
Freedom, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1983, 2021 (2018) (“To encourage marriage, these states impose what 
could be considered penalty default rules . . . .”).  
6. See Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 869 (Theis, J., dissenting upon denial of rehearing). 
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Prospectively, our approach to nonmarital relationships rests on the 
principle that such relationships should be seen as one of a continuum of 
possible types of intimate relationships,7 and their legal regulation should 
reflect the parties’ intentions in entering into them, intentions that are shaped 
by differing community norms.8 Central to such an approach are assumptions 
about the concept of equality between partners and between marital and 
nonmarital couples. At one time, marriage was conceived of as an 
intrinsically hierarchical institution necessary to protect women from the 
stigma and impoverishment associated with nonmarital sexuality. In that 
context, nonmarital relationships were associated with shame in some cases 
and, in others, the desire to craft more egalitarian unions. 
Today, at a time when more than nine million people have entered into 
nonmarital unions9 and when women enjoy access to the means of 
self-support (albeit not full equality),10 the nature of nonmarital unions has 
 
7. As Gregg Strauss notes, while “[m]any claim Obergefell’s reasoning insults nonmarital 
families by implying their family lives are less valuable,” this is not necessarily true: “[u]nless one 
assumes values are exhaustive and exclusive, then marriage, exclusive cohabitation, open 
relationships, extended families, and communal commitments can all be objectively valuable.” 
Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 655–56 (2018). 
8. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 97–98 (2016) 
[hereinafter Nonmarriage] (describing how expectations about parental involvement vary by race 
and class); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the 
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 298–99 (2015) (describing 
norm creation as an iterative process). Edin and Nelson, for example, observed that historically, 
marriage and parenting were a “package deal;” men who did not marry the mother of their children 
did not expect to play a role in the child’s life. KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE 
BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY 95 (2013). Today, however, unmarried fathers are 
more likely to remain involved in the child’s life, but mothers expect to have primary custody after 
the parents part, and both mothers and fathers see the father’s role as dependent on cooperation with 
the mother. See id. at 94–96; NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 3 (2000) (describing 
fathers’ role as dependent on a cooperative relationship with the mother). African-American 
communities, however, have institutionalized this role outside of marriage to a greater degree than 
whites. See Calvina Z. Ellerbe et al., Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement After a Nonmarital Birth: 
Exploring Differences by Race/Ethnicity 9–10, 20, 22 (Fragile Families & Child Wellbeing Study, 
Working Paper WP14-07-FF, 2014), https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/sites/ 
fragilefamilies/files/wp14-07-ff.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZU2-AGFT]. The fathers’ involvement in 
these communities does not necessarily correspond to the existence of formal custodial orders. See 
Patricia Brown & Steven T. Cook, Children’s Placement Arrangements in Divorce and Paternity 
Cases in Wisconsin, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY 2, 9–12, 18–19 (Nov. 2012), 
https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Task4A_CS_09-
11_Final_revi2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/28TX-4CED]. 
9. A.W. Geiger & Gretchen Livingston, 8 Facts About Love and Marriage in America, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Feb. 13, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/13/8-facts-about-love-
and-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/M8S9-VWF2]. 
10. Facts Over Time - Women in the Labor Force, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/NEWSTATS/facts/women_lf.htm#one [https://perma.cc/LC6R-
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changed. The stigma is gone and the reasons for entering into them have 
become much more varied, defying any cookie cutter approach to their legal 
regulation. We therefore argue that it is a mistake to assume that nonmarital 
relationships should necessarily generate the same legal consequences as 
marital ones or that a failure to generate the same legal consequences is 
somehow a penalty designed to discourage nonmarital relationships. Instead, 
legal regulations should follow from the nature of the relationships as they 
stand on their own terms, without a presumption that they rest either on 
interdependence between two partners making equal contributions or 
dependence arising from the assumption of gendered roles. 
* * * 
Blackstonian marriage was premised on distinct roles for men and women, 
and women’s intrinsic dependence because of them. Women may have been 
a “favorite,”11 but they were subordinated to their husbands during marriage, 
could not own property, and were barely capable of committing their own 
crimes. The fight for marriage equality could prevail only because, as Justice 
Kennedy recognized, marriage has moved far beyond an identification with 
such hierarchal and gendered roles. Even without accepting his elegiac and 
unrealistic vision of marriage,12 it is important to recognize that the legal 
regulation of marriage now treats spouses as equal and interdependent actors, 
who elect to enter their unions as an act of self-definition. While this 
“role-colored” vision of marriage certainly does not describe all marriages, it 
nonetheless influences the creation of the legal regime that governs the 
institution. This raises the question that many of us are continuing to explore, 
which is how to separate nonmarriage from marriage and ensure that 
nonmarriage remains a distinct status. 
The answers to that question diverge, even among those of us who are 
feminists. Some suggest that nonmarital partners should be entitled to many 
of the same rights as marital partners, arguing, for example, that any other 
 
6PME?type=image]. But see JUNE CARBONE, NAOMI CAHN & NANCY LEVIT, SHAFTED: WHY 
WOMEN LOSE IN A WINNER-TAKE-ALL WORLD (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript on file with 
authors). 
11. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421, *430–433; Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting 
Them from Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464, 1497–98, 1497 n.161 (2009). 
12. Melissa Murray tartly notes: “If this rose-colored vision of marriage is at odds with the 
experiences of those who are divorced, in marriage counseling, or in abusive marriages or families, 
Justice Kennedy and the majority stubbornly refuse to admit the disjunction.” Murray, supra note 
5, at 1213–14. 
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outcome privileges marriage and deprivileges nonmarital partners.13 Others 
of us argue that the very reason to celebrate nonmarriage and retain its distinct 
status is to ensure that marital privileges are not unjustly imposed, and that 
couples who do not want what marriage entails are free to create different 
types of relationships.  
This article embraces that second set of arguments. We begin by noting 
that equal relationships are different from unequal ones. Intimate, 
heterosexual relationships were once viewed as intrinsically unequal because 
sexual relations necessarily involved women’s risk of pregnancy, and only 
men could realistically expect to be able to generate the resources necessary 
to support a family. Both assumptions have changed. With the availability of 
reliable contraception and abortion, all couples who wish to do so can prevent 
childbearing.14 In addition, women are no longer either economically 
dependent because of gender or childbearing per se, nor necessarily the 
lower-earning spouse in intimate relationships. 
These realities have changed the foundation for the legal regulation of 
intimate relationships. Family law no longer needs to protect women as 
intrinsically dependent or to treat childbearing as the ultimate goal of intimate 
relationships. Instead, two distinctions become more important. The first is 
the difference between committed relationships, where the parties become 
interdependent, commingle resources, share decision-making and assume 
joint responsibility for children and other shared undertakings, versus 
contingent relationships, where the parties retain substantial financial and 
emotional independence. The second is the difference between relationships 
premised on equality, which involve equal respect and decision-making 
power within the relationship, versus relationships premised on inequality, 
with one party having dominant economic or decision-making power. 
 
13. E.g., Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital 
Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 239–40 (2015) (favoring greater emphasis on shared custody for 
unmarried couples); Merle H. Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or 
Share, 59 VILL. L. REV. 135, 147 (2014); Merle H. Weiner, Thinking Outside the Custody Box: 
Moving Beyond Custody Law to Achieve Shared Parenting and Shared Custody, 2016 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1535, 1573–74 (2016) (arguing for structures to establish the expectation of joint parenting at 
birth); see Murray, supra note 5, at 1258 (“[A] victory for marriage equality comes at the expense 
of the unmarried and nonmarriage. . . . [T]he decision . . . has strong potential to embed this 
inequality into the structure of constitutional law, reneging on the promise of constitutional 
protection for nonmarital life that was threaded through the jurisprudence of nonmarriage.”); 
Stolzenberg, supra note 5, at 2050. 
14. We recognize that some couples may wish to forego use of contraception and abortion but 
assume that those who consciously choose to do so may also wish to include provisions for 
childrearing as a condition for their intimate unions. See Ross Douthat, Red Family, Blue Family, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/opinion/10douthat.html 
[https://perma.cc/4AHB-QJZ5]. 
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The law of marriage has dealt with these distinctions by creating default 
rules that presume that marriage is based on commitment and 
interdependence, and equal contributions,15 while allowing room for other 
types of marital relationships expressed through premarital or other types of 
express agreements. The law of nonmarriage addresses these issues 
inconsistently, with considerable tension.16 The states vary in the degree to 
which they recognize nonmarital relationships at all and the extent to which 
they impose obligations, ratify agreements, untangle intertwined finances, or 
largely leave the couples the way they find them at the dissolution of the 
relationship.17 By contrast, the ALI (American Law Institute) treats 
long-term, unmarried couples as financially equal and interdependent, unless 
they opt-out of marriage-like property provisions.18 At the same time, the ALI 
creates multiple parental statuses, attempting to recognize functional 
relationships important to the child’s interests, while leaving room for less 
equal custody decision-making.19  
Even when states extend legal recognition to the existence of the 
relationships, they have yet to grapple with the multiple reasons that guide 
the decisions of modern couples to live together in informal relationships.20 
 
15. Because married women typically earn less than married men, marriage remains 
financially tilted towards men. Because married women disproportionately perform child care, the 
caretaking functions remain titled towards women. The law, however, presumes equal contributions 
through equitable division at divorce and a spousal elective share, and increasing presumptions of 
joint custody. See generally Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 120–21. 
16. The development of the doctrine of de facto parentage shows these tensions. See, e.g., 
Courtney G. Joslin, De Facto Parentage and the Modern Family, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 31, 32–33 
(2018); Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 
601–02 (2018); Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2265–66 (2017). 
17. Compare Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 59 (refusing to enforce agreements 
that “closely resemble those arising from conventional marriages”), with In re Marriage of 
Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (Wash. 2000) (imposing a community property regime on unmarried 
couples who commingle their lives and finances). 
18. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 819 (2005); Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: 
What’s Wrong with the ALI’s Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: 
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
305 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) [hereinafter Summarizing ALI Principles]. 
19. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.08–.09 
(AM. LAW INST., 2002). For some of the dangers of equal custodial decision making, see Joan S. 
Meier & Sean Dickson, Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family Courts’ Treatment 
of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation, 35 LAW & INEQ. 311, 331–32 (2017). 
20. Like Albertina Antognini, we are concerned about developing law based on “exceptional” 
cases. See Albertina Antognini, Against Nonmarital Exceptionalism, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891, 
1895 (2018). The different types of arrangements between nonmarital couples leads to questions of 
just which ones are unexceptional. In addition, these issues involve questions of differences across 
race, class, and regions. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 1013, 1039 (2018) (describing demographic differences among cohabitants). 
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In particular, the legal provisions have not dealt with the fact that there are 
four paradigmatic couples who choose to live together without marrying, and 
the needs of these couples are at odds with each other. The first group consists 
of couples who have become financially interdependent, share 
decision-making, and have undertaken mutual responsibilities (equal and 
committed). In many ways, these couples are otherwise indistinguishable 
from married couples. This group is in the best position to enter formal 
agreements or other legal arrangements ordering their relationship, but as the 
Blumenthal couple illustrates, even the sophisticated couples in this group do 
not always do so with respect to every aspect of their relationship.21 
The second group are couples in contingent relationships, typically 
without children. Although this group may involve two equals, they have not 
made a commitment to each other or to a fully interdependent relationship; 
their relationship is accordingly characterized by equal respect and equal 
contributions, but financial independence and autonomous decision-making 
(equal and contingent). 
The third group involves more traditional couples in which one party earns 
or has substantially greater resources than the other and has assumed a 
commitment to the other partner. This group involves neither equality within 
the relationship nor fully shared decision-making, but it does involve 
mutually understood obligations to what may be a financially dependent 
partner. The states generally enforce express agreements in this context, but 
the majority do not infer such obligations from the nature of the relationship 
itself (unequal and committed).22  
The fourth group, which generates the bulk of the controversy, are those 
relationships characterized by dependence, but neither unequivocal 
commitment nor equal status. In these cases, one partner may be better off 
than the other, and the second partner may, either from the beginning of the 
relationship or over the course of time, have come to depend on the wealthier 
partner’s superior resources. This group includes both couples where the 
dependence occurs because of the relationship, e.g., where a party gives up 
employment to care for children, and where the inequality exists at the 
beginning of the relationship, as in the case of actor Lee Marvin and Michelle 
Triola (unequal and uncommitted).23 
 
21. And the reasons for not formalizing their relationships range from a belief that there is no 
need to do so to the lack of availability of marriage or civil union status. 
22. See In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 841–42 (N.J. 2002). 
23. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976). The California Supreme Court identifies 
Michelle Triola Marvin as “Plaintiff” or as “Woman,” id. at 106, but this Article will identify her 
as Michelle Triola, see Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
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These unmarried relationships are far more varied than marital ones, and 
the two cohabitants in any particular relationship do not necessarily share the 
same understandings about the terms of their relationships. In addition, the 
four groups of cohabitants we have described above are likely to differ 
substantially from each other in important demographic respects.  
These groups clearly do not fit within a one-size-fits-all model of 
nonmarital relationships nor do nonmarital couples neatly sort into the four 
groups, as these categorizations may shift for a particular couple over time. 
This makes the construction of legal rules to fit these relationships 
challenging. We argue below that the most numerous groups who choose not 
to marry, whether consciously or by default, choose not to do so because their 
relationships lack either equality or a commitment to interdependence, and in 
some cases both. It is therefore inappropriate to impose on unmarried couples 
as a group marriage-like commitments that presume equality and 
interdependence. 
In short, our argument is that, in the past, the opposition to recognition of 
nonmarital relationships was based initially on the intrinsic dependence of 
women, or, in later years, to protection of same-sex partners who could not 
marry. But this “women as victim” narrative is more complicated today for 
two reasons. First, many of today’s nonmarital relationships do not fit the 
stereotype of dependent women, wealthier man. Second, even when they do, 
imposing obligations because of cohabitation per se has consequences that 
go beyond the circumstances of the individual couple. The effect is to take 
one of the four groups we delineated above and to make it the paradigm case 
for all nonmarital relationships. The result is deeply ironic. At a time when 
marriage has become an institution premised on formal equality, this 
approach makes nonmarriage one premised on an assumption of inequality; 
that is, an assumption that lower-earning partners need protection much like 
the women in the Blackstonian marriages of old. Moreover, in doing so, it 
fails to distinguish two very different circumstances: one in which a 
higher-earning partner fails to commit to a partner who has become 
dependent because of the circumstances of the relationships and one where a 
partner refuses to commit because the other partner was never capable of 
making equal contributions to the relationship. In the abstract, the distinction 
between these two relationships can be difficult to determine, but as a 
demographic matter, they correspond closely to relationships identified in 
terms of the intersection of class and gender.  
Parts I and II explore the legal issues that frame nonmarital relationships. 
Part III argues that, while nonmarital couples should be able to enter into 
contracts based on their relationship that are then enforceable, imposing 
status-based obligations does not adequately recognize the variations in these 
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relationships. It recommends the development of French, PACS-style options 
for nonmarital couples and the enactment of designated beneficiary statutes 
as an alternative as well as recognition and enforcement of contractual 
arrangements based on, and in, the relationship.24 
I. THROWING BRICKBATS AT BLUMENTHAL V. BREWER 
In 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Blumenthal v. Brewer, revisited 
and reaffirmed its long-standing refusal to recognize common law claims 
based on “marriage-like” relationships. The opinion is easy to disparage. It 
adopts language insisting on a bright line distinction between married and 
unmarried relationships and concludes that it is well-settled Illinois policy 
that “the state [has] a strong continuing interest in the institution of marriage 
and the ability to prevent marriage from becoming in effect a private contract 
terminable at will, by disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property 
rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”25 Invoking the Supreme Court’s 
Obergefell opinion as evidence of the continuing importance of marriage, the 
Blumenthal decision appeared to vindicate Obergefell critics’ fears that 
Kennedy’s paean to marriage would furnish “a constitutional rationale for 
states to prioritize and privilege marriage above nonmarital relationships.”26 
It seems to deny any of the “spaces in between” the binary of marriage and 
nonmarriage through its failure to recognize, regulate and support an 
intermediate status short of marriage itself.27 While Blumenthal’s rhetoric 
goes further than most states in privileging marriage, the fact is that relatively 
few states would give Brewer a share of Blumenthal’s medical practice, 
including those that express greater support for cohabitation agreements.28 
What the case fails to do, however, is to illuminate the policies on which 
those decisions are based. To understand why, it is necessary to reexamine 
Blumenthal itself.  
 
24. One of the criticisms of designated beneficiary and comparable statutes is the lack of 
usage. In 2010, there were two PACS for every three marriages. Scott Sayare & Maïa de la Baume, 
In France, Civil Unions Gain Favor over Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/europe/16france.html [https://perma.cc/K659-
CBNR]. 
25. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 58 (citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 
1211 (Ill. 1979)). 
26. Murray, supra note 5, at 1247; see also Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA 
(2017), supra note 16, at 595. 
27. Courtney Cahill, The Space in Between, JOTWELL (June 12, 2019), 
https://family.jotwell.com/the-space-in-between/ [https://perma.cc/VM8C-M5EA]. 
28. See Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 64–68 (providing an overview of cases examining the 
theory of unjust enrichment in the context of unmarried couples). 
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The opinion is easy to dislike, in large part because it is in so many ways 
a backward-looking decision. 
First, the facts of the case, which describe the relationship between the 
parties, Eileen Brewer and Jane Blumenthal, look back to a period when 
same-sex couples could not legally marry in Illinois. This simultaneously 
makes the outcome a denial of the reality of their relationship and a poor 
model for grounding the approach to future nonmarital relationships because 
all of the indications are that if the couple had been able to marry, they would 
have done so. 29 They took numerous steps indicating that intent. Early in their 
twenty-nine-year relationship, they “exchanged rings as symbols of their 
lifelong commitment to each other and presented themselves to their families 
and friends as a committed couple.”30 In 2002, they cross-adopted their three 
children, which required undergoing a home study.31 When Cook County 
created a “Domestic Partner Registry,” they filed an affidavit declaring in 
2003 that they had been domestic partners since 1981 and they were 
“responsible for each other’s common welfare.”32 In 2005, they took out a 
marriage license in Massachusetts, though they did not marry there and, even 
if they had, the marriage would not have been recognized in Illinois.33 In 
short, the couple’s relationship is more typical of marital than nonmarital 
unions because of the commitment, interdependence, and efforts to acquire 
legal recognition. And while the case thus presents a question of justice for 
same-sex couples who were denied the right to marry, the facts of the case do 
not present a realistic foundation for addressing how unmarried couples 
should be treated in the future. 
The second factor contributing to the backward-looking nature of the 
opinion is its reliance on dated Illinois legal history. The leading, some would 
say infamous, case in Illinois before Blumenthal had been the 1979 case of 
Hewitt v. Hewitt.34 Victoria Hewitt, the plaintiff in that case, had become 
pregnant in 1960 when she and Robert Hewitt were college students at 
Grinnell. That was the year in which the shotgun marriage was at its height—
30% of brides gave birth within eight and a half months of the nuptials, a 
 
29. Our assumption is that they would have done so, given how they lived their lives. See 
Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., 10.2% of LGBT Adults Now Married to Same-Sex Spouse, GALLUP (June 
22, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/212702/lgbt-adults-married-sex-spouse.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/FV69-KLM6] (finding the lesbian marriage rate is up and the cohabitation rate is 
down). And that’s why the case is wrongly decided. 
30. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, ¶ 3, vacated in part, rev’d in part by 
Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781 at ¶ 89. 
31. Id. at 171. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 172. 
34. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979). 
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percentage previously seen in 1800.35 The appropriate response to a 
pregnancy was marriage; back alley abortions were illegal and dangerous and 
only 5.3% of total births in the United States were to unmarried women (even 
less for white college students like Victoria).36 If she and Robert didn’t 
manage to pull off the ceremony before her pregnancy began to show, they 
might experience considerable embarrassment. Robert, for whatever reason, 
convinced her that the solution was to just tell people that they had eloped.  
When the relationship ended, decades later and after three children, she 
filed for “divorce,” alleging that Robert persuaded her to live as though they 
were married, and she “devoted her entire efforts to assisting in the 
completion of defendant’s professional education and the establishing of his 
successful practice of pedodontia,” even asking her parents for financial 
help.37 She wanted what she had been promised—the same terms available 
through marriage.  
By that time, the California Supreme Court had issued its landmark 
Marvin decision. That decision rejected longstanding case law that treated 
agreements made in the context of unmarried intimate relationships as void 
as against public policy, and instead upheld the enforceability of express or 
implied contracts growing out of the relationships, so long as sex was not the 
explicit consideration for the promises. Although Michelle Triola never 
received relief herself, the decision appeared to touch off a revolution in the 
treatment of nonmarital cohabitation.38 
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, rejected the Marvin ruling, saying 
no to Victoria Hewitt, because of the public policies favoring a bright line 
distinction between those who enter into a state-sanctioned relationship 
(marriage) and those who do not.39 The court expressly found that couples 
could not create legally enforceable “marriage-like” relationships entirely on 
their own, holding that the legislature had settled the matter when it abolished 
recognition of common law marriages entered into after 1905. Victoria had 
every right to feel betrayed. After all, had she insisted on marriage in 1960, 
Robert probably would have married her, and in that era, he could not have 
the benefit of her contributions to his dental practice and a relationship with 
his children without doing so. 
 
35. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION 
AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 79 (2010) [hereinafter RED FAMILIES]. 
36. CHILD TRENDS, BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED WOMEN: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 
3 (2015) https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/75_Births_to_Unmarried_ 
Women.pdf [https://perma.cc/STP8-8AY2]. 
37. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), overruled by Hewitt, 394 
N.E.2d at 1211. 
38. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122–23 (Cal. 1976). 
39. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1211. 
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Today, virtually everything about this relationship would have been 
different. Victoria would have been able to prevent a pregnancy through use 
of contraception, and she could have had an abortion had that failed.40 Had 
she continued an unplanned pregnancy, she and Robert could have timed the 
marriage with less concern about stigma, and she would have been much 
more likely to pursue a career, particularly if Robert refused to marry her.41 
Their case is even more exceptional in today’s terms than Blumenthal and 
Brewer’s.42  
The Blumenthal court reiterated that nothing had changed legally since its 
1979 opinion, declaring that “our decision in Hewitt did no more than follow 
the statutory provision abolishing common-law marriage, which embodied 
the public policy of Illinois that individuals acting privately by themselves, 
without the involvement of the State, cannot create marriage-like benefits.”43 
The court acknowledged the societal changes in intervening years that 
provided greater acceptance of nonmarital relationships and removed much 
of the stigma associated with nonmarital sexuality.44 It nonetheless 
emphasized the state interest in regulating intimate unions and rejecting the 
ability of the parties to create marriage-like rights as a matter of private 
agreement or to treat state-sanctioned unions as private arrangements 
“terminable at will.”45 It thus underscored the continuing state interest in 
distinguishing marital from nonmarital unions as a matter of public policy, 
 
40. See RED FAMILIES, supra note 35, at 77–105 (summarizing the impact of contraception 
and abortion on changes in family formation); Elaine Godfrey, What It Means To Defund Planned 
Parenthood, ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/defunding-planned-parenthood-in-
iowa/520674/ [https://perma.cc/K2VL-MBME] (discussing the effects of changing contraception 
and abortion laws in Iowa). 
41. See RED FAMILIES, supra note 35, at 120–21, 194 (noting change in the percentage of 
mothers who work outside the home). 
42. Relationship fraud, however, exists in different ways in every era but has rarely been 
actionable. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, INTIMATE LIES AND THE LAW 3 (2019). 
43. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 61. 
44. Id. at ¶ 58 n.1 (citation omitted) (“The Hewitt court also questioned and considered the 
history of whether granting legal rights to cohabiting adults would encourage “what have heretofore 
been commonly referred to as ‘illicit’ or ‘meretricious’ relationships” which could weaken the 
institution of marriage. Today, this court does not share the same concern or characterization of 
domestic partners who cohabit, nor do we condone such comparisons. Nonetheless, as explained 
herein, a thorough reading of Hewitt makes clear that the core reasoning and ultimate holding of 
the case did not rely nor was dependent on the morality of cohabiting adults.”). 
45. Id. at ¶ 81. 
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privileging the institution of marriage and deferring to the legislative process 
for any substantive change.46  
Moreover, while the court upheld the ability of the parties to contract 
between themselves and to pursue unjust enrichment and restitution claims, 
it rejected such claims where the parties could not show that such claims had 
“an independent economic basis apart from the parties’ relationship.”47  
The Blumenthal majority, in its reliance on Hewitt, thus failed to address 
nonmarital relationships on their own terms, refusing to impose or imply 
terms replicating the marital bargain. 
A spirited concurrence/dissent revisited the rationale the Hewitt court used 
as the basis for this doctrine. Justice Theis noted that Hewitt insisted that to 
be valid, sexual relations could not be part of the consideration for the 
agreement, decrying “the naivete . . . involved in the assertion that there are 
involved in these relationships contracts separate and independent from the 
sexual activity, and the assumption that those contracts would have been 
entered into or would continue without that activity.”48 The dissent, while 
agreeing that the courts should not attempt to revive common law marriage, 
nonetheless objected that the majority’s description of the basis for 
contractual or restitutionary claims was too narrow. Given that at the time of 
the Hewitt decision, fornication still violated Illinois law, the dissent saw no 
reason to continue to require a showing of “an independent economic basis 
apart from the parties’ relationship.” It argued that nonmarital partners should 
be able to “bring the same common-law claims available to other people.”49 
That is comparable to the result in Marvin,50 which the Hewitt majority 
had considered and rejected. In Marvin, the California Supreme Court did not 
require that the parties demonstrate an independent economic basis apart 
from the parties’ relationship for an express or implied agreement to be 
enforceable. Instead, the court ruled that such an agreement “even if 
expressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, is invalid 
only if sexual acts form an inseparable part of the consideration for the 
agreement.”51 The difference between the two cases thus affects not only the 
 
46. The court stated for example: “now that the centrality of the marriage has been recognized 
as a fundamental right for all, it is perhaps more imperative than before that we leave it to the 
legislative branch.” Id.; see also Gunderson v. Golden, 360 P.3d 353, 355 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015) 
(observing that “[t]he elimination of common-law marriage, supported by an explicit public policy 
justification, commands our courts to refrain from enforcing contracts in contravention of clearly 
declared public policy and from legally recognizing co-habitational relationships in general”). 
47. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 1188781, at ¶ 73. 
48. Id. at ¶ 99 (Theis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
49. Id. at ¶ 114. 
50. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123 (Cal. 1976). 
51. Id. at 114. 
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substance of the Illinois standard requiring an independent economic basis 
for an alleged agreement to share assets or expenses, but the burden of proof. 
In Illinois, a party like Brewer bringing a common law action has the burden 
of showing that the matter was independent of the parties’ agreement to live 
together; in California, Brewer would only have had to show that the sexual 
acts were independent of the parties’ agreement. 
Nonetheless, as Ira Ellman argued, a quarter century after the Marvin 
decision, courts purporting to follow Marvin almost never find express 
agreements, partly because few parties enter into them,52 and they have 
largely been unwilling to imply agreements, even where the parties lived 
together and commingled their affairs in a manner similar to Blumenthal and 
Brewer.53 Part of the reason is that parties in such cases can often credibly 
claim that they did not share the same assumptions about the nature of their 
relationship. In one California case following Marvin, for example, the 
lower-earning partner testified that the parties had agreed that they would 
treat their relationship as though they were married.54 The higher-earning 
partner testified, however, that the couple had never discussed the concept of 
support after separation. He stated, “That was not part of our life. It was not 
part of what we were doing . . . . [W]hen we split up, we split up.”55 In other 
words, he stated that the parties’ had no lasting commitment to each other, 
much less an agreement promising to take care of each other after the 
relationship ended. The dissent, in contrast, emphasized the facts that should 
have led to an implied contract on the basis of the parties’ relationship. The 
case was particularly compelling because the plaintiff had followed her 
partner to Alaska, taken care of their children, supported him though law 
school, and suffered a disabling injury over the course of the relationship. 
Judge Poche’s dissent concluded that: 
 
52. Cf. Maguire v. Coltrell, No. CV-14-01255-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 6168417, at *4 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 21, 2015) (finding that parties did not show existence of agreement or joint venture and 
partner’s contribution to living expenses was part of their cohabitation arrangements and 
demonstrated neither a partnership agreement to pool resources nor a basis for unjust enrichment). 
But see Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 667 (Ariz. 1984) (observing that “[a]lthough isolated acts of 
joint participation such as cohabitation or the opening of a joint account may not suffice to create a 
contract, the fact finder may infer an exchange of promises, and the existence of the contract, from 
the entire course of conduct between the parties.”); W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 
1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992) (recognizing implied agreement to treat couples’ joint assets as community 
property). 
53. See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1365, 1367–69 (2001). 
54. Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894 (Ct. App. 1993). (finding that 
“[r]espondent and appellant did not believe that a license for marriage was necessary to bond 
together in a lifetime commitment. Thus, they vowed to be husband and wife and to strive to be 
partners in all respects ‘without any sanction by the State.’”) 
55. Id. at 895 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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If [twenty-one] years of living together in a mutually supportive 
family relationship, of taking title to property and otherwise 
conducting one’s financial affairs as if one were married is 
insufficient evidence of an implied contract to conduct oneself as 
married with all the moral and legal obligations to the other spouse 
that such a relationship entails, then I simply cannot imagine any 
relationship which the majority would find sufficient.56 
Ellman concludes that Justice Poche’s reasoning may have been the point 
of the post-Marvin line of cases; explicit agreements are fine, but implied 
ones are not to be assumed on the basis of the relationship itself.57 As a 
practical matter,  this would require either that the couple put their agreement 
in writing or that they specifically  assented (and could later prove their 
assent) to particular terms such as financial support after dissolution of the 
relationship. 
It is striking therefore that the Blumenthal court, in spite of its more hostile 
rhetoric and legal reasoning, nonetheless resolved the parties’ financial 
claims in similar ways to other states.58 It allowed the partition claim to 
proceed, resolving the parties’ respective interests in their jointly titled house. 
The difficult question concerned Brewer’s claim of an ownership interest in 
Blumenthal’s medical practice.59 
Few courts are willing to assume from the fact of cohabitation alone, even 
long-term cohabitation, a legally enforceable agreement to commingle the 
parties’ financial affairs, even where they would assume, from the fact of 
marriage, just such an intent.60 Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court, for 
example, rejected Brewer’s claim to a share in Blumenthal’s medical 
partnership, even though the claim was based on the use of commingled 
funds. A California court is likely to reach the same conclusion, agreeing that: 
1) the parties had no express agreement with respect to sharing the medical 
partnership; 2) they had no express agreement to treat assets purchased with 
funds from their joint account as jointly owned, and, therefore; 3) any 
 
56. Id. at 904 (Poche, J., dissenting). 
57. Ellman, supra note 53, at 1367–69. 
58. It remains far away from the Washington status-based “committed intimate union” 
approach, for example. Moreover, Brewer was unable to recover the funds she contributed to 
purchasing Blumenthal’s medical practice. While the court explained that there had been no specific 
accounting of monies, it did not even give her the relief of a token restitutionary claim. Blumenthal 
v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 73.  
59. The court observed that while the action to partition the house was permissible, the 
“problem arose when Brewer counterclaimed for various common-law remedies, including sole 
title to the home as well as an interest in Blumenthal’s ownership share in a medical group so that 
the couple’s overall assets would be equalized now that the couple had ended their relationship.” 
Id. at ¶ 3.  
60. Ellman, supra note 53, at 1372. 
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agreement to treat the partnership as jointly owned property would depend 
on implying an agreement from the “parties’ relationship, because the 
purchase was made for the family’s financial security,” something the courts 
in neither state are inclined to do.61  
Nonetheless, the courts in many states have been willing to impose a 
constructive trust where the two parties contributed financially to the 
acquisition of property, and to sort through the parties’ respective 
contributions in that context.62 In Blumenthal, however, the court emphasized 
“Brewer’s counterclaim does not provide a specific amount of funds she 
contributed to Blumenthal’s ownership interest in GSN.”63 Even if that level 
of detail had been available, the court stated that the use of the funds 
was an investment for the family, which included Blumenthal, 
Brewer, and their children. It was not an investment between 
business partners. Nor was it the kind of arm’s-length bargain 
envisioned by traditional contract principles. Rather, the 
arrangement to use the parties’ commingled funds was an 
arrangement of a fundamentally different kind, which . . . is 
 
61. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, at ¶ 72. Compare id. (where the better off partner had owned 
part of a medical practice), with Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (Ct. App. 1993) (where 
the better off partner had owned a legal practice). 
If they were married, the analysis would be: first, were the funds used to purchase the 
partnership marital property or subject to distribution at divorce? If the funds came from the 
parties’ earnings over the course of a marriage, then they would ordinarily be treated as joint 
funds. See, e.g., Miller v. Wilson, No. 16-0587, 2017 WL 2608426, at *4 (W. Va. June 16, 
2017) (treating all property and earnings acquired by either spouse during a marriage as 
marital property). Second, does the jurisdiction treat the use of joint funds to purchase an 
asset titled in one parties’ name as a gift to that spouse? The states vary in their treatment of 
this issue, but most do not resolve the issue on the basis of title alone, allowing the spouse 
whose name is not on the title to claim a right to reimbursement based on the use of joint 
funds. Compare McKay v. McKay, 8 S.W.3d 525, 531 (Ark. 2000) (allowing the use of 
tracing to show that funds in a jointly entitled account came primarily from one spouse’s 
separate property and did not constitute a gift to the marital estate); Jackson v. Jackson, 765 
S.W.2d 561, 561–62 (Ark. 1989) (where one spouse deposited separate property into a joint 
account, and then later used funds from the joint account to purchase property titled in her 
name alone, the use of property from the joint account did not make the property marital 
property), with Knecht v. Palmer, 252 So. 3d 842, 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (presuming 
that “[W]hen one spouse deposits funds into a joint account where they are commingled with 
other funds so as to become untraceable, a presumption is created that the spouse made a gift 
to the other spouse of an undivided one-half interest in the funds.”) (alteration supplied). 
62. See, e.g., Cates v. Swain, 215 So. 3d 492, 494–95 (Miss. 2013) (upholding unjust 
enrichment claim based on monetary contributions to purchase of parties’ joint home, titled in the 
name of only one of the partners, while rejecting possibility of equitable claims based on the 
relationship itself). 
63. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781 at ¶ 72. 
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intimately related and dependent on Brewer’s marriage-like 
relationship with Blumenthal.64 
In addition, where the parties commingle funds in a joint account, the 
courts generally start with a presumption of joint ownership, which can be 
rebutted if the parties can trace the source of funds.65 But given that both 
parties have the right to withdraw funds and use them for individual as well 
as joint purposes, the mere fact that funds from a joint account were used to 
acquire an asset does not in itself establish joint ownership of the asset where 
it was titled in one parties’ name alone.66 
In the Blumenthal case, for example, Blumenthal, a doctor, earned more 
than Brewer, a lawyer who took time out of the paid labor market to care for 
the couple’s children.67 Thus, tracing would support Blumenthal’s claim to 
the majority of the funds in the joint account. In addition, to the extent the 
couple used the account to pay joint expenses, these outflows would be 
attributed to Blumenthal and Brewer jointly, wiping out most or all of 
Brewer’s contributions to the bank account.68 Thus, tracing would help 
Brewer only if the court, first, assumed that all funds deposited into the 
account constituted a gift from the individual partners to a jointly owned 
enterprise, and then that use of the joint funds to purchase a separately owned 
medical partnership gave the partner without title a right to get back her share 
of the joint funds used for the purchase.  
The crux of the case thus depended on treating the deposit of funds into a 
joint account as a gift, treatment that does not ordinarily occur simply from 
the titling of the bank account itself.69 Instead, Brewer’s claim depended on 
the court’s willingness to infer an intent on Blumenthal’s part to treat her 
deposits into the account as gifts on the basis of the nature of the parties’ 
relationship—and that’s what the court refused to do. While the Illinois Court 
rejected Brewer’s claim on the basis of public policies favoring bright-line 
 
64. Id. at ¶ 71. Of course, the same thing was true of the parties’ home. The difference in that 
case is that the parties held title to the property jointly. 
65. Indeed, even within marriage, the courts have held that merely depositing funds in a joint 
account does not necessarily make the funds jointly owned. See, e.g., Wu–Carter v. Carter, 179 
A.3d 711, 720–21 (R.I. 2018) (concluding that wife’s depositing of gift from her parents into a joint 
account did not transmute separate property into marital property). 
66. See generally Leslie Joan Harris, Tracing, Spousal Gifts, and Rebuttable Presumptions: 
Puzzles of Oregon Property Distribution Law, 83 OR. L. REV. 1291, 1314 (2004) (describing how 
tracing works to rebut a presumption of marital property). 
67. Blumenthal, 2016 IL 118781, at ¶ 2. 
68. Moreover, in many cases, the courts view the resources the lower-earning partners 
receives during the relationship as compensation for nonmonetary contributions. See, e.g., 
Tompkins v. Jackson, No. 104745/2008, 2009 WL 513858, at *1, *13–14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 
2009). 
69. See cases cited supra note 61. 
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distinctions between marital and nonmarital relationships; other courts, like 
the California court in Friedman, have done so because they have refused to 
imply enforceable commitments on the basis of the facts of the parties’ 
relationship.70 And outside of states that recognize a right of property 
distribution for unmarried cohabitants,71 most courts have not been willing to 
recognize separately titled property as jointly owned simply because it was 
acquired over the course of a relationship in which parties otherwise pooled 
resources.72 The courts have typically required either joint title or tracing of 
specific monetary contributions into the asset to provide relief.73 
Going beyond what is available in Washington state, the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of Family Dissolution (ALI Principles)74 urges 
effectively making the same remedies available following the dissolution of 
a cohabitation as a marriage. These principles, however, had have not been 
 
70. The major exception has been Washington, which has been willing to recognize a 
community property regime in the context of a long-term committed relationship where the parties 
commingled their finances in a manner similar to the couple in Blumenthal. See In re Marriage of 
Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (Wash. 2000) (citing Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 831 (Wash. 
1995)); see also W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992) (recognizing 
implied agreement to treat couples’ joint assets as community property). 
71. In addition to Washington and Nevada, which apply community property regimes to 
unmarried couples, two common law states, Alaska and Oregon, also recognize the ability to 
distribute property held over the course of unmarried relationship in accordance with the parties’ 
presumed intent. See, e.g., Reed v. Parrish, 286 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Alaska 2012). In Reed, the Alaska 
Supreme Court ruled that a house held in one partner’s name could nevertheless be treated as joint 
property where the parties “intended to acquire property as though married.” Id. (In determining 
the parties’ intent, the court looked at factors such as whether they: “(1) made joint financial 
arrangements such as joint savings or checking accounts, or jointly titled property; (2) filed joint 
tax returns; (3) held themselves out as husband and wife; (4) contributed to the payment of 
household expenses; (5) contributed to the improvement and maintenance of the disputed property; 
. . . (6) participated in a joint business venture[; and (7)] raised children together or incurred joint 
debts.” (citing Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804, 811 (Alaska 2002))); see also Tomal v. Anderson, 426 
P.3d 915, 923 (Alaska 2018) (concluding that simply living together is not sufficient to show the 
requisite intent, and that the parties are not necessarily presumed to share all property equally, but 
that the nature and conduct of the parties’ relationship could be used to infer intent with respect to 
ownership). 
Oregon also provides for a property division at the conclusion of a nonmarital relationship in 
accordance with the parties’ intent and allows the courts to infer intent from the fact of cohabitation, 
an agreement to share incomes, and joint acts of a financial nature such as “a joint checking account, 
a joint savings account, or joint purchases.” In the Matter of Domestic P’ship of Joling, 443 P.3d 
724, 728 (Or. 2019); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978). 
72. See Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 61–69 (summarizing cases).  
73. Id. at 69. 
 74. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 6 (AM. LAW. INST. 2002). 
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fully adopted by any state,75 although some Canadian provinces and other 
jurisdictions have established such rights.76  
II. A LEGAL TYPOLOGY OF UNMARRIED COUPLES 
To determine the legal recognition appropriate for unmarried couples 
requires determining what the purpose of legal regulation is. We have argued 
elsewhere that the purpose of recognizing such relationships is autonomy; 
that is, support for the ability of intimate couples to enter into relationships 
on terms of their choosing without being forced into a one-size fits all version 
of marriage.77 The concept of autonomy, by itself, however, cannot provide a 
comprehensive explanation because unmarried couples often do not agree on 
the terms that govern their relationships.78 So the choice of default provisions, 
whether the provisions involve obligations similar to marriage, or no 
obligations at all, will necessarily favor some parties at the expense of 
others.79 Instead, we used the concept of autonomy to suggest that legal 
regulations should parties promote two concepts. First, legal regulations 
should provide notice as to the nature of the obligations couples incur in 
 
75. Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 66 n.53 (citing Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot 
“Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1280 (2015)) (“the 
ALI Principles have created controversy and that the provisions addressing the property 
distribution between unmarried partners have not been adopted by any state”); see also 
Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 66 n.53 (citing Garrison, supra note 18, at 839–854) (“criticizing 
ALI Principles because of the failure to require consent to assumption of nonmarital 
obligations”). 
76. See Anna Stępień-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, The Consequences of Cohabitation, 50 
U.S.F. L. REV. 75, 86–87 (2016); see also Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c A-
4.5 (Can.), http://www.qp.alberta.ca/1266.cfm?page=A04P5.cfm&leg_type=Acts&isbncln= 
9780779780334 [https://perma.cc/N7FX-8PT3]; Family Statutes Amendment Act, S.A. 2018, c 18 
(Can.), https://www.assembly.ab.ca/ISYS/LADDAR_files/docs/bills/bill/legislature_29/session 
_4/20180308_bill-028.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4KU-FYN5] (making numerous references to the 
Interdependent Relationships Act and substantially affects the rights of those who qualify as Adult 
Interdependent Partners); ALBERTA, FAMILY LAW CHANGES: BILL 28 UPDATES PROPERTY DIVISION 
LAWS TO INCLUDE UNMARRIED PARTNERS AND IMPROVE CHILD SUPPORT FOR ADULT CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES https://www.alberta.ca/family-law-changes.aspx [https://perma.cc/995Z-H65H]; 
Laura Buckingham, From Recommendation to Legislation: Bill 28 Implements ALRI’s 




77. See Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 121.  
78. Id.  
79. See, e.g., Stolzenberg, supra note 5, at 2030. Stolzenberg argues that “the problem is more 
fundamentally one of competing neoliberal principles: whether to respect the new family freedom 
by refusing to impose ex post family-based obligations on the richer party, or to privatize a poorer 
party’s dependency by granting recovery despite ambiguity about family intent.” Id. at 2019.  
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entering into a relationship,80 and, second, the idea of notice should depend 
not just on formalities such as registration or contract, but on the extent to 
which default obligations correspond to community norm about 
responsibility for dependent partners.81 These concepts of notice and 
consonance with community norms may include public policy concerns 
about protecting the vulnerable, but only to the extent they involve accepted 
community norms that put couples on notice of the obligations they are 
undertakings. Otherwise, the regulation of nonmarriage risks simply 
replicating marriage as the consequence of cohabitation. Considering the 
appropriate level of regulation therefore requires consideration of why 
couples who could marry choose not to do.  
In the section below, we argue that such couples can be divided into four 
categories, who should be seen as having different obligations to each other. 
We arrive at these categories by looking at the characteristics of modern 
marriages. Marriage ordinarily involves a commitment to interdependent 
finances and the joint assumption of responsibilities. Married couples, for 
example, are substantially more likely than unmarried couples to have joint 
bank accounts and jointly titled property.82 In addition, while marriage once 
involved intrinsically hierarchical relationships, today equal respect and 
decision-making power have become more important to the longevity of 
relationships.83 And marriage continues to involve a long term commitment, 
one that couples are more likely to make to each other if they trust each other 
or share interests such as children.84 Moreover, married couples are more 
 
80. Garrison, supra note 18, at 888.  
81. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the 
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 328 (2015) (observing the 
relative harmony between spouses’ preferences and the societal norms and legal default rules that 
form the common understandings about marital behavior and the difficulty of establishing similar 
support in the context of novel unmarried relationships). 
 82. See Fenaba R. Addo & Sharon Sassler, Financial Arrangements and Relationship 
Quality in Low-Income Couples, 59 FAM. REL. 408, 411 (2010) (finding that married couples are 
more likely to pool income). 
83. See Hara Estroff Marano, Love and Power, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Jan. 1, 2014), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/articles/201401/love-and-power [https://perma.cc/2F5P-
WUD2]. 
 84. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of 
Heterosexual Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 1, 12 (2007) (finding that low income women 
report reluctance to marry men they may have to “evict”); Michael S. Pollard & Kathleen Mullan 
Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage Intensity: Consolidation, Intimacy, and Commitment 14 
(RAND Lab. & Population Working Paper No. WR-1001, 2013), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1001.html [https://perma.cc/YQJ2-R4A2] 
(observing that “cohabitors are . . . substantially less certain about the permanence of their 
relationships than respondents in married relationships, and they report substantially lower levels 
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likely than unmarried couples to characterize their relationships in similar 
terms to each other. For example, cohabiting males are significantly less 
likely than cohabiting females to report that they “love . . . [their] partner a 
lot” or to view the relationship as a committed one, while there are no 
significant differences on these measures between male and female spouses.85 
In considering the different groups of unmarried couples, therefore, we use 
equality and commitment to identify four groups, focusing on why the groups 
choose to marry or not, and how these factors influence the arrangements they 
undertake during their relationships. And we conclude that with the 
acceptance of unmarried sexuality, three of the categories do not present a 
major cause for concern because the couples who are either committed or 
equal have the capacity to opt into voluntary arrangements if they choose. 
The fourth, however, involving unequal couples without a shared 
commitment to each other, raises the same concerns that once led society to 
treat all women as dependent and to deal with that dependence by 
shepherding intimate partners into marriage and keeping them there.  
The four groups can be classified as follows: 
First are the “equal and committed” relationships that involve 
commitment, producing financial interdependence, and equal respect, 
reflecting shared decision-making and mutual assumption of responsibilities. 
Blumenthal v. Brewer, at least at the point where the couple made 
commitments to each other, adopted their respective children and comingled 
their financial affairs, involved such a relationship. Such couples typically 
marry, but where they mutually choose not to, they have the capacity to 
provide for their own affairs. We suspect, for example, that if Blumenthal and 
Brewer had the choice of opting into a legal status equivalent to marriage, 
they would have done so, and in that case, they would have been subject to 
marital property provisions treating the assets produced over the course of 
the relationship as jointly owned. In the absence of such a formal legal status, 
almost all states recognize actions such as taking joint title to property or 
entering contracts with respect to the treatment of particular assets, such as a 
jointly run business, as enforceable, but differ about the enforceability of 
cohabitation agreements that simply replicate marriage, with some states 
willing to enforce them and states like Illinois treating them as void. 
Second are the “equal and contingent” couples. Relationships in this group 
may involve equal respect and equal assumption of responsibilities, but do 
not involve commitment or interdependence. These relationships are more 
 
of ‘complete’ commitment to their partner, especially for males” while “married relationships of 
any duration consistently ranked higher on all of the intensity measures than cohabitations at even 
the longer durations”). 
 85. Pollard & Harris, supra note 84, at 12–13. 
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contingent, with the retention of greater individual independence within the 
relationship. The couples in this group may move in together as a matter of 
convenience, or they may view the cohabitation as a test of their long-term 
viability as a couple. While, overall, these couples tend to be younger than 
other groups, they also include older couples who may enter into relationships 
for companionship late in life. These couples typically keep their financial 
affairs separate. They are less likely than married couples to have joint bank 
accounts, jointly titled property, or long-term commitments to care for each 
other.86 Young couples in this category typically have relatively few assets, 
while older couples may intentionally keep their assets separate, intending 
any inheritance to go to their children from earlier relationships.87 Some of 
the couples in this group will eventually transition to more committed 
relationships; indeed, Blumenthal and Brewer almost certainly started out in 
this category at the beginning of their relationship. But research shows that 
couples in this category often make quite conscious decisions not to marry, 
and often express their reasons for not marrying in terms of their desire to 
make it easier to end the relationship.88 These couples should not have 
obligations imposed on them to share property and provide support at the 
relationship’s end. 
Third, those couples who have a committed but economically unequal 
relationship. Within these relationships, the wealthier party has made a 
commitment at the outset of the relationship to provide for the other partner, 
even without marriage. Perhaps the most celebrated case involves Arthur 
Roccamonte, who promised to provide for Mary Sopko for the rest of her life 
 
 86. See Addo & Sassler, supra note 82, at 411 (finding that married couples are more likely 
to pool income). 
87. See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 17–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), modified, 
(Jan. 22, 1993) (refusing to enforce oral promise in case where husband insisted on a premarital 
agreement and left the bulk of his estate to a daughter from a previous marriage).  Cohabitation for 
older people can mean not being responsible for each other’s debts and not losing government 
benefits dependent on their prior marriages. See Paula Span, More Older Couples Are “Shacking 
Up,” N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/health/older-americans-
unmarried-couples.html [https://perma.cc/MS27-YWZX]. 
88. See, e.g., SHARON SASSLER & AMANDA JAYNE MILLER, COHABITATION NATION 12–14 
(2017); Addo & Sassler, supra note 82, at 415 and accompanying text; Daniel T. Lichter et al., 
Cohabitation, Post-Conception Unions, and the Rise in Nonmarital Fertility, 47 SOC. SCI. RES. 134, 
136 (2014); Amanda J. Miller et al., The Specter of Divorce: Views From Working- and Middle-
Class Cohabitors, 60 FAM. REL. 602, 613 (2011) (observing that “[w]orking-class cohabitors––
particularly the women––were more than twice as likely to express concerns regarding how hard 
marriage was to exit than were middle-class respondents, emphasizing the legal and financial 
challenges of unraveling a marriage.”); Sharon Sassler & Amanda J. Miller, Class Differences in 
Cohabitation Processes, 60 FAM. REL. 163, 172–174 (2011). 
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if she came to live with him.89 Roccamonte died intestate, but the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held the promise, which Roccamonte had reiterated numerous 
times in the presence of others, to be enforceable.90 Though the legislature 
subsequently changed the statute of frauds to require a writing for such 
promises to be enforceable in the future,91 New Jersey would recognize such 
an express commitment if made in writing. In these relationships, the critical 
factor is the express agreement of the wealthier party to provide for the 
dependent party, and the state’s criteria for what is necessary to recognize 
such an agreement, such as the requirement of a writing or a determination 
of the circumstances in which such an agreement to provide support beyond 
the termination of the relationship can be implied.92 
Such express agreements, however, are rare.93 The more controversial 
issue is whether such agreements can be implied, typically from the facts of 
the relationship itself. At the time of dissolution, however, the parties 
typically dispute the existence of an agreement, leading to the fourth 
category. 
The fourth group, which generates the bulk of the controversy, are those 
relationships characterized by dependence, but neither unequivocal 
commitment nor equal status. In these cases, one partner may be better off 
than the other, and the second partner may, either from the beginning of the 
relationship or over the course of time, have come to depend on the wealthier 
partner’s superior resources. Often in these cases, the decision not to marry 
is a unilateral rather than a mutual one, with the economically superior party 
refusing to marry or to enter into a formal agreement in circumstances in 
which the economically weaker party would prefer such a commitment. In 
addition, the parties often report different understandings about their 
relationship at the time of dissolution. In Marvin, for example, Triola alleged 
that Marvin promised to “provide for all of plaintiff’s financial support and 
needs for the rest of her life,” a promise that would make the relationship a 
committed one, equivalent to Roccomonte.94 Triola, however, was never able 
 
89. We treat this case as “committed” because Roccamonte made an express promise to 
provide for her “for the rest of her life” without conditioning the promise on the continuation of 
the relationship. See In re Estate of Roccamonte, 808 A.2d 838, 846–48 (N.J. 2002). 
90. Id.  
91. See Maeker v. Ross, 99 A.3d 795, 797 (N.J. 2014) (holding N.J. REV. STAT. § 25:1–5(h) 
(2018) (the statute of frauds) to apply prospectively only). 
92. Marvin noted: “courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether 
that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture.” 
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976); see also Reed v. Parrish, 286 P.3d 1054, 1057 
(Alaska 2012); Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (Or. 1978) (inferring agreement to share assets on 
the basis of the parties’ relationship). 
93. Ellman, supra note 53, at 1367 n.17. 
94. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (1976). 
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to prove that Marvin has made such a promise and Marvin almost certainly 
viewed his refusal to marry as a refusal to make such a long-term 
commitment, either emotional or financial, to Triola.95 These relationships 
are unequal and “contingent,” in the sense that the higher earning party, by 
not marrying and by not entering into an express agreement, has reserved the 
right to unilaterally terminate the relationship without any long term 
obligation to the dependent partner. The question with which courts struggle 
is whether the parties owe each other anything when the relationship ends 
and, in particular, what the parties should owe each because of the nature of 
the relationship itself. 
Consider a comparison of courts’ approaches to two different cases. In 
one, the couple chose to live together when plaintiff-respondent was twenty-
five years old.96 The parties agreed to live together as though they were 
married; “they vowed to be husband and wife and to strive to be partners in 
all respects ‘without any sanction by the State.’”97 Over the twenty years, they 
moved from California to Alaska and back.98 One had a child before they 
began the relationship, but they also had children of their own during the 
relationship.99 One of the parties completed law school and went into 
practice; the other took care of the children, delayed returning to school 
because of a sick child, and had a herniated disk that made it difficult to study 
or work.100 The parties also planned a wedding ceremony, but when the higher 
earning partner could not travel because of bad weather, the ceremony was 
called off and never rescheduled.101 When they ended the relationship, they 
owned several properties titled in both their names, which they divided, and 
the wealthier party was ordered to pay child support in a separate 
proceeding.102 The question the California court had to address was whether 
grounds existed to order the wealthier party to pay support.103 The court 
concluded no, relying in large part on the wealthier party’s testimony that the 
pair had never discussed what would happen if the relationship ended, and 
hence that there was no enforceable promise or commitment.104 The 
 
95. See Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 873–74, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (Ct. App. 
1981) (holding that Marvin “never had any obligation to pay plaintiff a reasonable sum as and for 
her maintenance.”). 
96. Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993. 
97. See id. 894–895. 




102. Id. at 895, 904 n.1.  
103. See id. at 896.  
104. See id. at 898–899.  
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lower-earning partner in this case had, however, become dependent on the 
other over the course of the relationship, at least in part because of the 
responsibilities assumed over the course of the relationship.105  
Consider now an alternative case in Hawai’i.106 Again, in this case, the 
parties entered into a relationship when they were young, both in business, 
and in relatively equal circumstances.107 They were engaged to marry.108 One 
of the parties (Simmons), however, suffered a reversal in business fortunes 
and the other (Samulewicz) called off the wedding for fear of being exposed 
to potential liability.109 They nonetheless had a spiritual ceremony, lived 
together, and one of the partners managed property titled in the other’s 
name.110 When the relationship ended after seven years, the less successful 
party wanted a share of the property. The Hawai’i Supreme Court dismissed 
the contract and implied contract claims, emphasizing that “[c]ohabitation, 
no matter for how long, does not by itself prove the existence of a contract 
implied-in-fact.”111 The court nonetheless allowed an unjust enrichment 
claim to move forward that provided an opportunity to recover the $46,000 
in mortgage payments and the tens of thousands of dollars in other sums 
Simmons had invested in properties held solely in Samulewicz’s name.112 In 
this case, the lower earning party had become dependent over the course of 
the relationship, but not necessarily because of the relationship itself.113 The 
court distinguished between expenses “related to maintaining their household 
and which ‘tend to [the] mutual comfort and convenience of the family’” such 
as upkeep of a car and of their common house and those transfers that went 
“beyond the scope of ‘services’ for the ‘mutual comfort and convenience of 
the family.’”114 
In both of these cases, the parties may had different notions of what their 
decision to live together without marrying meant.115 In both cases, the parties 
agreed to treat their relationships as “marriage-like,” but without either the 
 
105. See id. at 895 (describing how the lower-earning partner did not return to school as 
planned, in part, because of the birth of a second child with health problems). 
106 Simmons v. Samulewicz, 304 P.3d 648 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013). 
107. Id. at 654.  
108. Id. at 657. 
109. Id. at 651. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 656 (quoting Aehegma v. Aehegma, 797 P.2d 74, 79 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990)). 
112. Id. at 656, 658–59. 
113. Id. at 657–58. 
114. Id. at 657–58 (alteration in original). 
 115. See, e.g., Michael S. Pollard & Kathleen Mullan Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage 
Intensity: Consolidation, Intimacy, and Commitment 12–13 (RAND Labor & Population, 
Working Paper No. WR1001, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2284457 [https://perma.cc/56Q3-
376S] (indicating that cohabiting males reported lower levels cohabiting females).  ) 
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legal commitment to each other of a marriage or agreement on what would 
take place if the relationship ended. In the Friedman case, however, one party 
became dependent because of the arrangements during the relationship: she 
moved to another state, did not complete college as she had planned, took 
care of the children, worked on their joint properties, and suffered an injury 
that prevented her working and interfered with her planned return to school. 
In the Simmons case, in contrast, Simmons’s financial reverses did not occur 
because of the relationship, and his management of the rental property did 
not prevent him from assuming other employment. Nonetheless, Simmons 
supported Samulewicz’s business travel and career development just as 
Friedman supported her partner’s acquisition of a law degree. And Simmons 
made substantial contributions to the property held solely in Samulewicz’s 
name (with the parties transferring title solely to Samulewicz to protect it 
from Simmons’s creditors).116 
This group of relationships is characterized by inequality and a decision, 
often a unilateral one, by the dominant partner not to assume responsibility 
for the dependent one. These relationships may nonetheless involve an 
exchange of the dominant partner’s resources for the other partners’ 
contributions to homemaking, childrearing or business assistance over the 
course of the relationship. When they end, they may leave the dependent 
partner feeling betrayed. These relationships are often seen in gendered 
terms, including the prototypical “woman as deserving and dependent 
victim.” Indeed, the type of financial dependence at the core of these 
relationships has historically been a major reason for insisting on marriage as 
the necessary institution to protect the dependent, the unequal and the 
vulnerable, particularly when women were the intrinsically weaker party 
given the risk of pregnancy, limitations on property ownership, and lack of 
protection against discrimination. And today a principal argument for not just 
enforcing express agreements, like the one in Roccamonte, but implied 
agreements in cases like Friedman, is to ensure that women’s domestic 
contributions receive recognition and protection.117 Yet, as Simmons shows, 
the nature of the exchange within intimate relationships can take a variety of 
forms. To date, the line the law draws tends to be between express 
agreements, which may be enforceable, and implied-in-law ones, which are 
not, and between monetary contributions to an asset such as rental property 
versus contributions to the home or the relationship itself.118 It is possible to 
 
116. Id. at 651 (noting that Simmons said he transferred his interest in the property to 
Samulewicz, in part, to protect the property “from potential creditors of his business”). 
117. Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2139, 2148–49 (2019) 
(arguing that domestic contributions ought to be recognized and valued). 
118. Id. at 2139–40. 
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imagine more expanded obligations that would presumably apply to both 
Friedman and Simmons, yet the differences between the two cases create a 
conundrum. 
First, the argument for protection of the dependent partner in a case like 
Friedman is the same argument that has historically been made for 
channeling couples into marriage: the intrinsic inequality that arises from 
childrearing or from one party’s disproportionate assumption of domestic 
responsibilities that benefit both. Now that marriage has become an 
institution premised on formal equality, those who choose not to marry often 
do so, like Mr. Friedman and Ms. Samulewicz, precisely because at least one 
of them does not want the obligations marriage entails. Imposing obligations 
on them requires a public policy determination that protection of a lower-
income partner is an important public policy objective for a nonmarital 
relationship. Inside of marriage, of course, family law presumes that the 
parties have agreed to create an interdependent economic union, but even that 
presumption comes from the treatment of marriage as an agreement to 
long-term commitment and commingling of the parties’ financial affairs 
rather than because of the presumption that marriage is uniquely designed to 
protect the dependent.119 Outside of marriage, there is no such presumption, 
and in fact nonmarital couples differ systematically from marital couples in 
their willingness to commingle their finances.120 Taking the position that 
dependent nonmarital relationships require the imposition of default rules to 
protect the vulnerable thus requires taking the position that at least certain 
types of relationships involve what marriage once did—the imposition of a 
societally mandated obligation to provide for the intrinsic vulnerabilities 
associated with at least certain types of intimate relationships. 
Second, cases like Friedman and Simmons exist on a continuum that defies 
easy categorization of the normative basis for implied contract terms. Many 
proposals would tie default, status-based terms for nonmarital relationships 
to the length of the relationship, differences in income and commingling of 
the couples’ assets—criteria that would produce similar results in Friedman 
and Simmons. Yet, there is a fundamental difference between the two cases: 
Friedman’s dependence arises in large part because of the decisions made 
over the course of the relationship while Simmons’s dependence occurs to a 
greater degree because the financial reverses that occurred independently of 
the couples’ arrangements. Indeed, while Simmons contributed to properties 
held in his partner’s name, we have no information as to which partner 
handled the majority of the couples’ domestic responsibilities. It is possible 
 
119. See Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 84–85. 
120. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, at ¶ 6. 
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that Samulewicz both earned more and did more at home. The normative 
foundation of the two cases is thus arguably different, but making a fact 
specific distinction between the two cases would be challenging.121 Elliott 
Friedman, after all, could maintain that Terri Friedman’s real problem was 
her back injury, which disrupted a mutual agreement that they would take 
turns going back to school, and Simmons could argue that his assumption of 
domestic responsibilities allowed Samulecisz to undertake the travel that 
advanced her career and led to a job in Europe. 
Professor Antognini alleges that, in cases like Simmons, “[t]he courts’ 
concern . . . becomes whether the man seeking property failed in his 
traditional role of breadwinner,”122 that is, the courts impose gendered 
expectations in its assessment of the parties’ respective contributions to the 
relationship. The existing cases, however, arguably involve the opposite: 
Scott Simmons is treated like Eileen Brewer and Terri Friedman with respect 
to compensation for household services. The real gender disparity comes 
from the fact that courts recognize his claim for unjust enrichment, with men 
more likely than women to make the type of monetary contributions that rise 
to the level of Simmons’s restitution claim.123 
Third, the differences between the two cases also involve differences in 
community norms that reflect the intersection of race, class, and gender. 
Friedman describes a typical middle-class case in that the man’s income is 
higher and more stable than the woman’s, with decisions over the course of 
the relationship increasing the disparities between them. While the couple in 
Simmons appear to be similarly well off, their concerns are more typical of 
working-class relationships, where one party is reluctant to take on the debts 
of another. 
Unlike the couples in Marvin or Friedman, working-class parties 
(including many women) are reluctant to commit to a marriage-like 
relationship because of concerns about a partner’s income stability, expenses, 
and debts. A study of cohabitants in their twenties indicated that among those 
with some college, more of the women than the men expected to marry their 
current partners;124 other studies indicate that better-off young men are more 
 
121. For example, in Friedman, Terri’s back problems may or may not be independent of the 
relationship, and her physical injury prevented her from returning to school. In Simmons, the court 
emphasized Simmons’ contributions to the rental property, but we do not know whether he did so 
in ways that precluded other employment opportunities. 
122. Antognini, supra note 20, at 1935. 
123. See id. 
124. “Among cohabitants in their twenties who have completed at least some college, for 
example, 68 percent of women but only 46 percent of the men expect to marry their current partner. 
Better-educated men are more likely to report concerns about relationships limiting their future 
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likely than women to see their current partner as holding them back.125 
Among couples with less education, however, the men were more likely than 
the women to say that they expected to marry their current partners. And other 
studies of this group indicate that the women see instability in the men’s 
contributions to the relationship as a potential threat—a commitment to see 
the men through bad times often comes at the expense of resources women 
see as necessary to their or their children’s well-being.126 Both types of 
concerns lead to decisions to cohabit rather than marry, and both types of 
cohabitation may change over time, breaking up or becoming more 
committed or more dependent as circumstances change. The Fragile Families 
study, for example, found that only about one-third of couples who were 
cohabiting at the birth of their child were still together five years later,127 
despite the fact that other studies have shown that the majority of cohabitants 
stated that they intended to marry.128 One major reason that the relationships 
of younger cohabitants end is because of the role of domestic violence—
violence often associated with the pregnancy itself.129 
Expectations concerning the future of the relationships diverge based on 
class and gender. While cohabitation precedes most marriages,130 cohabitants 
differ in their expectations about marriage. Low income women are 
concerned about a commitment to a man who is financially unreliable; such 
a commitment can threaten the resources on which they rely for supporting 
 
opportunities, and to fear that a commitment to their current partner may hold them back. These 
men (and some women) may separate their current interest in sex from what they see as true 
romantic love or the kind of unconditional commitment they hope to extend to someone else in the 
future.” June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Family Law & Emotion, in THE EDWARD ELGAR RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON LAW AND EMOTIONS (Susan Bandes et al. eds., forthcoming 2020); see also KAY 
HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOT YET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 28 
(2013), http://nationalmarriageproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KnotYet-FinalForWeb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9QHC-7745]. 
125.  MARK REGNERUS & JEREMY UECKER, PREMARITAL SEX IN AMERICA: HOW YOUNG 
AMERICANS MEET, MATE, AND THINK ABOUT MARRYING 210 (2011). 
126. Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 96–97. 
127. Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study: Fact Sheet, PRINCETON U. 1, 
https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/sites/fragilefamilies/files/ff_fact_sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NQ3-KWRA]. 
128. Maureen R. Waller & Sara S. McLanahan, “His” and “Her” Marriage Expectations: 
Determinants and Consequences, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 53, 56 (2005) (finding that in most 
couples, both partners expect to marry, and their shared expectations are the strongest predictor of 
marriage and separation following their child's birth). 
129. Jennifer Barber et al., The Relationship Context of Young Pregnancies, 35 LAW & INEQ. 
175, 196 (2017). 
130. Colleen N. Nugent & Jill Daugherty, A Demographic, Attitudinal, and Behavioral Profile 
of Cohabiting Adults in the United States, 2011–2015, 111 NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP. 1 (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr111.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SMA-E6HS]. 
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themselves and their children.131 For cohabitants between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-nine who are not high school graduates, less than half of 
the women (47%)—but two-thirds (67%) of the men—state that they expect 
to marry their current partners.132 Better-educated young men, by contrast, 
are more likely to report concerns about relationships holding them back,133 
and among cohabitants with at least some college, it is the women who are 
more likely than the men to report that they expect to marry their current 
partner (68% of women, 46% of men).134 
In different communities, the normative and practical contexts in which 
nonmarital relationships occur, both in terms of individual perceptions of 
obligation and community norms, are not uniform. These factors suggest that 
designing default terms to govern nonmarital relationships will be 
challenging if not impossible. We argue below that the result should be a 
distinction between supplying legal regulation versus imposing governance, 
and between facilitating voluntary agreements versus supplying broad based 
and legally binding default terms.  
III. OPTIONS 
The four categories above demonstrate how nonmarital relationships do 
not rest on a single set of assumptions, and, indeed, we recognize that 
nonmarital relationships change over time, defying easy categorization.135 
Moreover, all the evidence suggests that unmarried couples are less likely 
than married ones to agree on the nature of their relationship. In addition, 
women remain more likely to stay in the labor market in the context of a 
contingent relationship than in a committed one and working-class women 
feel freer to refuse to do a disproportionate share of nonmarket labor in 
cohabiting relationships.136  
 
131. Bowman, supra note 84, at 11. 
132. HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 124, at 28; see also Miller supra note 88, at 602, 613 
(observing that “[w]orking-class cohabitors—particularly the women—were more than twice as 
likely to express concerns regarding how hard marriage was to exit than were middle-class 
respondents, emphasizing the legal and financial challenges of unraveling a marriage”).  
133 See, e.g., REGNERUS & UECKER, supra note 125, at 192 (reporting that ambitious men want 
sex as recreation but are wary about the limitations of more committed relationships). 
134 HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 124, at 28. 
135. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Living Apart Together as a “Family Form” Among Persons 
of Retirement Age: The Appropriate Family Law Response, 52 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2–4 (2018). The article 
discusses nonmarital couples who, although they are not cohabitants, are committed couples with 
equal respect and equal assumption of responsibilities, but not financial interdependence. 
136. See Suzanne Bianchi et al., Gender and Time Allocation of Cohabitating and Married 
Woman and Men in France, Italy, and the United States, 31 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 183, 186 (2014), 
 
1276 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
Doing justice to these relationships accordingly requires embracing 
couples’ autonomy and intent in creating nonmarital relationships137 and 
giving them more tools for crafting and ratifying express agreements, 
particularly with respect to financial matters. The proposals recognize that, 
particularly at the end of a relationship, the couple may differ substantially 
from each other (and from their starting assumptions about their 
relationships). Therefore, the legal specification of default terms can help 
shape expectations about nonmarital obligations.  
A. Proposals 
Moving forward, there are a number of different means for recognizing 
the differing types of relationships. A notable aspect of Brewer was the 
court’s plea for legislative direction, a plea that is being answered by the 
ULC’s new Drafting Committee on the Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants. 
The proposals can be seen along a continuum. At one end is status; similar 
to the ALI proposal or the legislation in the Canadian province of Alberta, 
couples become domestic partners by living together for a set period and 
sharing a life.138 At the other end is a Marvin-type approach, recognizing 
contract and unjust enrichment. Along the continuum are opt-in 
arrangements, such as the French PACS139 or the Colorado designated 
beneficiary status.140  
 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4231537/ [https://perma.cc/DRC9-XTYA]. The 
difference in nonmarket work patterns is limited based on controlling for age and educational 
attainment, but that is not surprising, given that cohabiters are typically younger than married 
couples. 
137. Kaiponanea Matsumura, A Right Not To Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1541–44 
(2016). 
138. The details on length of time and the criteria for an interdependent relationship vary, 
depending on the scheme. See, e.g., Catherine Brown & Kyle T. Gardiner, The Rights of Unmarried 
Cohabitants in Canada, 24 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 86, 89–90  (2018) (discussing Alberta Act, prior to 
its 2018 amendment); Summarizing ALI Principles, supra note 18, at 305–06; Family Law Changes, 
GOV’T OF ALBERTA (2019), https://www.alberta.ca/family-law-changes.aspx#toc 
[https://perma.cc/9AXW-RC9S]. 
139. See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 632–43 (2013); Ji Hyun 
Kim, Scott A. Oliver & Margaret Ryznar, The Rise of PACS: A New Type of Commitment from the 
City of Love, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 69, 83–88 (2017).  
140. See John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship 
Recognition?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 386–87 (2015). 
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1. Establish the Legal Status of Nonmarriage 
Recognition of nonmarriage as its own legal status means starting 
from an examination of what nonmarriage is, rather than what it is 
not. True recognition of nonmarriage should make it easier for 
parties to select and enforce the terms of the relationship of their 
choice. This means courts should not only enforce formal contracts, 
when they exist, but also ensure enforcement when partners opt into 
other forms of legal recognition of their relationships.141   
In the absence of such formalities, the law should apply presumptions that 
recognize that nonmarital relationships exist on a continuum but start from a 
different basis from marriage. In accordance with this principle, the courts 
should presume that the parties expect to remain financially independent, 
they expect to receive credit for contributions to the acquisition of major 
financial assets such as a house (or medical practice), and they do not 
anticipate tallying up contributions for routine day-to-day expenses such as 
groceries in the absence of an express agreement and record keeping that 
would make such an accounting fair and practical. Financial professionals 
should assist. The purchase of a home or a car or the opening of a bank 
account is a formal event, with opportunities to think about how to take title 
and to establish a record that reflects the parties’ respective contributions. In 
contrast, there should be no expectation of financial obligations arising from 
informal day-to-day exchanges.142 
2. Domestic Partnership Registries 
Jurisdictions could establish domestic partnership registries (similar to 
Colorado’s designated beneficiary status) that not only allow parties to 
register their unions, but also allow them to select from a menu of options to 
govern the terms of their relationships. These form agreements could include 
items such as health care decision-making power, the treatment of bank 
accounts and liability for expenses, provisions for support, etc. They could 
be designed to require both parties’ consent to create the union and unilateral 
withdrawal with notice to the other party.143   
 
141 Twenty-six percent of lawyers in the American Association of Matrimonial Law report 
increased interest in cohabitation agreements. Joslin Davis, Avoiding a Costly Cohabitation 
Divorce, HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joslin-davis/avoiding-
a-costly-cohabit_b_10261306.html [https://perma.cc/55CM-SLX9]. 
142. See Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 112. 
143. See Culhane, supra note 140, at 386–87. 
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3. PACS 
The French PACS (Pacte Civil de Solidarité) provides an alternative 
model, and it is even more flexible than civil unions or domestic 
partnerships.144 
To enter into a PACS, the couple must sign an agreement, using either a 
standard form or a more individualized agreement.145 The substance of the 
agreement is that the parties agree to live together as a couple and share 
household expenses and ordinary debts incurred during the cohabitation. As 
is true with getting married, the partners are entitled to take leave from work 
when entering into a PACS. There are no inheritance rights, although the 
surviving partner does have some protections (such as housing and taxes if 
any assets are inherited). The PACS can be dissolved by either party by 
registering the request for dissolution. The pact must be registered with the 
civil registry, although the couple can appear before a notary, who will then 
undertake the registration. The requirements are: 1) PACS agreement 
(personalized agreement or official form); 2) joint declaration of a civil 
solidarity pact (PACS); 3) birth certificates; and 4) valid identity 
documents.146 
A PACS allows for certainty for nonmarital partners so that they can 
choose whether to create rights inter se, and it also serves a channeling 
function, providing a simple and efficient mechanism for courts to determine 
legal rights. 
Of course, if applied in the United States, this option raises enactability 
issues, as some states have abolished the status of civil union or domestic 
partnership following the Supreme Court’s Obergefell decision, and no state 
has followed the leads of Hawaii and Colorado in creating reciprocal 
beneficiaries or designated beneficiaries.147 
 
144. See, e.g., Directorate of Legal and Administrative Information, Civil Solidarity Pact 
(Pacs), SERVICE-PUBLIC.FR, https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/N144 
[https://perma.cc/RGA3-A8ZA]; Civil Partnerships (Pacs), NOTAIRES DE FR. (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.notaires.fr/en/couple-family/civil-partnership-pacs [https://perma.cc/YFV6-LYW6]; 
Marriage and PACS (Civil Partnerships) in France, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN FR. (June 
2019), https://fr.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/50/Marriage-in-France-Oct-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6XTV-8GZJ]. 
145. Directorate of Legal and Administrative Information, To Pacser, SERVICE-PUBLIC.FR 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1618 
[https://perma.cc/5W7U-MHGW] (“Future partners must write and sign an agreement . . . [and] [i]t 
must at least obligatorily mention the reference to the law instituting the PACS: ‘We, X and Y, 
conclude a civil solidarity pact governed by the provisions of . . . the civil code.’ The convention 
can be more complete and specify the conditions of participation of each one in the common 
life . . . .”) (translated). 
146. Id. 
147. See Culhane, supra note 140, at 383, 385–86. 
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Finally, there are a distinct set of issues to consider during these 
relationships, apart from those at the end. The law could facilitate caretaking 
without recognizing emotional commitment by, for example, allowing for 
hospital privileges.148 
B. Objections 
Proposals to recognize default rules for unmarried couples that treat the 
couples as financially independent, rather than impose marital-type 
obligation that presume financial interdependence, are controversial. 
1. Care of Those Who Become Dependent over the Course of 
Relationship 
The failure to impose marriage-like obligations effectively means that a 
higher-earning party has no continuing obligations to the lower-earning party, 
even when their disparities in earning power occurred over the course of their 
relationships. Such assumptions—for example, one that unmarried couples 
intend no benefits for the lower-earning party absent an express agreement—
risk benefitting the stronger (typically male) party at the expense of a weaker 
and dependent party (typically the female)149 in circumstances in which the 
parties are unlikely to have equal bargaining power. Indeed, courts and 
scholars have recognized that the failure to intervene favors the financially 
better-off party and argued that this is an important concern to address.   
The problem is that a paradigm that presumes a stronger and weaker party 
and a consequent obligation to protect the weaker party imposes uniformity 
on a set of diverse relationships—and assumes what has historically been a 
gendered pattern of dependence.150 But this presumption does not reflect the 
reality of contemporary nonmarital relationships. Not all cohabiting parties 
involve rich men living with (and taking advantage of) dependent women, 
and it is a mistake to base the law of nonmarriage on a one-size fits all view 
of cohabiting relationships. As women’s economic opportunities have 
 
148. See Bowman, supra note 84, at 48. 
149. “For in using choice-based arguments to resist assignment of resources to poorer family 
members, richer parties rely upon neoliberal premises, in particular that freedom consists in strong 
property entitlements and that property transfers are illegitimate absent title holders’ consent.” 
Stolzenberg, supra note 5, at 1989. 
150. Of course, men can be dependent on their partners, and women can be dependent on 
female partners. But the historical legacy of Blackstonian marriage presumes female dependence 
on a male partner as a justification for the imposition of marriage-like obligations. As we have 
suggested, however, in the comparison of Friedman and Simmons, the patterns that give rise to 
dependence vary from case to case and may reflect a variety of gendered patterns. 
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increased, the courts have recognized the growing variety of circumstances 
that underlie cohabitation and have refused to intervene, even if that refusal 
strengthens the position of the financially dominant partner. To the extent that 
dependence per se is protected, it should be tied to the existence of 
dependence arising from the assumption of joint responsibilities such as 
children, as in the Hewitt family.  
2. Using Exceptional Cases 
Professor Antognini argues that the cases that dominated nonmarital 
decision-making have been exceptional ones involving same-sex partners or 
reverse gender different sex paradigms such as that in Simmons. And she is 
certainly right in a sense; women are more likely than men to be in a 
dependent position because of what happened during the relationship and to 
sue to vindicate feelings of betrayal like those in Hewitt, Friedman, Marvin, 
and Blumenthal. Yet, the typical case of cohabitation in the United States is 
not one between a doctor and a lawyer (Blumenthal), a movie star and a starlet 
(Marvin), or even a Berkeley lawyer and a homemaker who lived together in 
the Alaskan wilderness (Friedman). Instead, nonmarital cohabitation tends to 
correspond with class. 
Young, well-educated couples have become increasingly likely to live 
together outside of marriage, but they tend to bear children overwhelmingly 
in committed relationships that typically involve marriage. Less educated 
couples are less likely to marry before giving birth, and they often reverse the 
typical gender presumptions, with women expressing greater reluctance to 
marry than men. The better off a different sex couple is, the more likely the 
man earns more,151 the poorer the couples, the more likely it is that the woman 
earns more, and Miller and Sassler report that women who are the primary 
wage-earners in a relationship are more reluctant than other women to 
marry.152  
 
151. Jill E. Yavorsky et al., Women in the One Percent: Gender Dynamics in Top Income 
Positions, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 54, 74–75 (2019); Andrew Van Dam, Among 1-Percent Earners, 
Where Are all the Women?, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2019, 8:20 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/02/13/glass-ceiling-is-even-higher-penthouse-
women-percenters-are-rare/?utm_term=.02c88d030530 [https://perma.cc/PD87-KS4M]. 
152. Amanda Jayne Miller & Sharon Sassler, The Construction of Gender Among Working-
Class Cohabiting Couples, 35 QUALITATIVE SOC. 427, 443 (2012) (indicating that women who were 
the primary wage-earners were more reluctant to marry); see also Bowman, supra note 84, at 12 
(finding that low income women report reluctance to marry men they may have to “evict”). Of 
course, wealthy women may well act the same way, refusing to marry a long-term cohabitant who 
poses a threat to their financial well-being.  
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The couples who have become more likely to marry—and more likely to 
stay together—are those who see themselves as contributing equally to a 
relationship—or are blinded by love. Overall, marriage has become far more 
based on “assortative mating” with the couples who wed marrying people 
much like themselves153 once they have achieved a certain economic standard 
of living.154 Financial equality and higher earnings are associated with 
cohabitation leading to marriage and with relationship stability, regardless of 
marriage.155 
We view the four groups as distinct and yet difficult to distinguish in 
practice because the couples may change from relatively equal and 
uncommitted at the beginning of the relationship to less equal, but more 
interdependent over the course of the relationship. The most unjust cases are 
those like Blumenthal, where the parties exchanged promise to live together 
“like a married couple” and one of the parties later breached that promise by 
ending the relationship and taking the majority of the resources that the 
couple produced jointly.156 Yet the answer is not to use the exceptional case 
to establish law for all categories of nonmarital couples. 
3. Elevating Marriage 
To be sure, such a system, which draws a bright-line rule based on 
marriage, may appear to fall into the trap of promoting and celebrating 
marriage at the expense of other forms of intimate relationship. Because it 
distinguishes rights based on marriage from those in other relationships, it 
allegedly privileges marital status and deprivileges others. 
Yet that formulation gets it backwards. Instead of imposing a one-size-
fits-all-with-opt-out on couples, as marriage does, this system recognizes that 
nonmarriage comes in different sizes and shapes. It tries to honor the reasons 
 
153. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING 
THE AMERICAN FAMILY 62 (2014); Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the 
American Family, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 165 (2006) (finding that greater assortative mating 
contributes to a reduction in divorce rates); Christine R. Schwartz & Robert D. Mare, Trends in 
Educational Assortative Marriage from 1940 to 2003, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 621, 641–42 (2005) 
(observing that assortative mating has increased over time). 
154. “Adjusting for couples’ absolute earnings, increases in wealth and couples’ earnings 
relative to’’ the economic standard associated with marriage is a strong predictor of marriage. 
Patrick Ishizuka, The Economic Foundations of Cohabiting Couples’ Union Transitions, 55 
DEMOGRAPHY 535, 535 (2018). 
155. Id. at 550. 
156. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, at ¶ 60. 
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that couples might choose marriage or a nonmarriage arrangement.157 The 
institution of “marriage has become a distinct—rather than universal—
bargain.”158 While marriage presumes a joint assumption of responsibility, 
nonmarriage is different. In marriage, “for richer, for poorer” is a literal 
statement of the obligations, and the law protects the investment that both 
partners make during the relationship itself and in their children. As a result, 
marriage is riskier in some ways because whatever property is earned during 
the marriage is subject to division, and whatever changes in workforce 
participation based on the marriage may not be compensated at divorce. 
Consequently, the spouses must take care in choosing their partner. 
Recognizing nonmarriage as a legitimate system on its own terms requires 
acknowledging the potentially differing understandings and expectations of 
the partners as well as the diverging populations that choose marriage. As 
marriage increasingly becomes the province of the elite, Simmons v. 
Samulewicz reminds us of the position of many women, especially the 
working class women unlikely to be the subject of precedent-setting judicial 
opinions, who are wary to assume the debts of their male partners. 
4. Judicial Discretion  
An additional concern about increasing the legal obligations that arise 
from cohabitation is the difficulty of determining who should get benefits. 
The ALI attempted to construct bright line rules that arose from the length of 
the cohabitation and that assumed that the parties’ lives became increasingly 
intermingled over time. Yet, the major objection to the Principles concerned 
the lack of notice to a couple that, just by moving in together, they might 
incur such obligations.159 An approach that allowed greater attention to the 
facts of particular cases, however, would dramatically increase uncertainty. 
Courts could reasonably differ, for example, on the facts of Blumenthal v. 
Brewer in deciding whether Brewer had been adequately compensated for 
her domestic contributions by her share of the property that the couple had 
held in joint title or by the support she had received during the relationship 
or from the contributions Blumenthal had made to her career as a lawyer. 
Allowing fact specific determinations in such cases could increase litigation 
costs and the complexity of these determinations. 
 
157. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1285 (2014) 
(discussing “the potential financial benefits of nonrecognition”); Matsumura, supra note 137, at 
1515 (explaining that people may not marry because of “legal consequences and personal beliefs”). 
158. Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 117.  
159. See Summarizing ALI Principles, supra note 18, at 315–18. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
While the default norm of marriage is the presumption of joint 
contributions, the default norm for nonmarriage could be established as a 
presumption of independence and separate finances. That is, marriage is a 
fixed institution premised on equality with a set of clear rules, while 
nonmarriage implies the freedom from set rules. For each, the law should 
facilitate options to craft arrangements on a continuum of terms.   
The ability to recognize nonmarriage as its own status has required the 
jettisoning of the once unshakeable conviction that all intimate relationships 
were intrinsically unequal, only men were in a position to be able to support 
a family, and any man capable of support who deserted his partner or their 
children (inside or outside of marriage) was a heel, and women were 
inevitably dependent.160 The law can only routinize nonmarital relationships 
if it acknowledges the reasons intimate partners do not marry.161 
The demographic reality is that nonmarital relationships exist on a 
continuum.162 Legal presumptions of formal equality between married and 
unmarried couples coerces heterogeneous couples into homogenous 
relationships. As a practical matter, this means the law should facilitate rather 
than impose nonmarital agreements, and it should encourage the voluntary 
assumption of shared responsibilities. 
 
160. The Supreme Court struck down such a presumption about marriage in Orr v. Orr, 440 
U.S. 268, 271 (1979). 
161. For unmarried biological parents, pressure is building to institutionalize equality in 
parents’ ongoing contact with children following dissolution of the adult relationships. See, e.g., 
Huntington, supra note 13, at 225–31. 
162. This is true for parenting relationships as well. See Nonmarriage, supra note 8, at 79. 
